| Line | $M | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Net income (GAAP) | 58,321 | starting point |
| + Provision for income taxes | 11,582 | eff. rate 16.6% |
| Pre-tax income | 69,903 | |
| + Interest expense | 102 | de minimis vs scale |
| − Interest income | (872) | cash on B/S |
| EBIT (operating) | 69,133 | vs GAAP OpInc $53.5B |
| + Depreciation & amortization | 997 | cash-flow stmt |
| EBITDA | 70,130 | 85.9% margin |
| Common adjustments | ||
| + Stock-based compensation | 1,928 | non-cash, debated |
| + Acquisition / one-time | 870 | est., illustrative |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 72,928 | 89.4% margin |
The bridge from $58.3B net income to $72.9B adj. EBITDA is short — taxes (16.6%) and a small D&A line — because NVDA carries almost no debt and capex is the customer's, not theirs.
The bridge EBIT line ($69.1B) sits above GAAP operating income ($53.5B). That's not a contradiction — non-operating items (mostly interest income on $53.7B of cash) flow through pre-tax. Read both, not one.
NVDA · $190.46MC $4.66T
Cash & marketable securities $53.7B · No net debt · D&A only 1.2% of revenue
~94% of revenue · Adj. EBITDA margin ~92%. Hyperscaler + sovereign AI + enterprise. The entire $4.66T market cap is, functionally, a bet on this line.
~6% of revenue · Adj. EBITDA margin ~62%. Strong absolute margin, but margin-dilutive to the consolidated number. Once strategic, now legacy.
Data center as % of revenue
| Metric | Value | Read |
|---|---|---|
| Total debt | $10.3B | Investment grade fixed |
| Cash & marketable securities | $53.7B | |
| Net debt | ($43.4B) | Net cash |
| TTM Adj. EBITDA | ~$240B | annualized run-rate |
| Net debt / EBITDA | (0.18x) | Negative |
| EBITDA / Interest expense | ~588x | Effectively infinite |
| FCF conversion (FCF / EBITDA) | ~87% | capex light |
NVDA isn't a credit story. It's a cash compounder. The $10.3B of debt outstanding is opportunistic balance-sheet management — not capital required to operate. The company could retire all debt with one quarter of free cash flow and have $40B left over.
The interesting question isn't "can they pay it back" — it's "what could justify deploying the $50B+ they accumulate every year?" Buybacks, dividends, megacap M&A (regulatory-permitting), and sovereign AI infrastructure deals are all in scope.
| Company | Profile | Rev (TTM) | Adj. EBITDA | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NVIDIA (NVDA) | AI accelerators | $240B+ | $215B+ | ~89% |
| Visa (V) | Card networks | $38B | $28B | ~73% |
| Mastercard (MA) | Card networks | $28B | $17B | ~61% |
| Microsoft (MSFT) | Software + cloud | $265B | $160B | ~60% |
| Apple (AAPL) | Devices + services | $400B | $140B | ~35% |
| Meta (META) | Social + ads | $165B | $95B | ~58% |
| Alphabet (GOOGL) | Search + cloud | $355B | $155B | ~44% |
Most analysts treat SBC as non-cash and add it back. Adj. EBITDA $72.9B at 89.4% margin. This is the headline number most decks use.
Moody's, S&P, and Fitch treat SBC as compensation paid in equity-dilution form. EBITDA $70.1B at 85.9% margin. Buffett and Munger agree.
At this scale the choice moves the multiple by ~3%. Disclose both, and check that the dilution showing up below the line (shares outstanding) is consistent with the SBC running above it.