| Line | $M | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Operating current assets | ||
| Accounts receivable | 175 | DSO ~44 days |
| Prepaid expenses | 42 | software, hosting prepays |
| Other current assets | 18 | deposits, contract assets |
| Operating current assets | 235 | excludes cash, marketable secs |
| Operating current liabilities | ||
| Accounts payable | (28) | DPO ~12 days |
| Accrued expenses | (98) | comp, marketing, taxes |
| Deferred revenue (current) | (207) | customer prepayments |
| Other current liabilities | (11) | misc |
| Operating current liabilities | (344) | excludes debt |
| Net working capital | (109) | Negative — capital-light SaaS |
| Normalized run-rate (NWC / Revenue annualized) | ||
| NWC % of LTM revenue | (7.8%) | benchmark: -5% to -12% for vertical SaaS |
Negative NWC is what investors mean when they say a business is capital-light. Customers fund operations. Every dollar of revenue growth produces more cash than the income statement suggests.
Negative NWC is a permanent reduction in working capital peg. A buyer settles at a normalized NWC target; if Klaviyo runs at -$109M, the buyer effectively gets ~$109M of customer prepayments as permanent operating funding.
KVYO · $16.18MC $4.45B
Cash $1.04B · Rev growth +33% YoY · NRR ~108% · Deferred rev. $207M
Q1 deferred rev typically runs ~16% above Q4 for SaaS with calendar-year renewal concentration. Klaviyo's exact figure: 16.3%. Acquirers normalize on a trailing-twelve-month average, not the Q1 snapshot.
Q1 spot ($109M deficit): seller-favorable. Buyer pays peg consistent with the moment of maximum customer prepayment.
TTM average (~$78M deficit): buyer-favorable. Smooths out the renewal calendar bump.
Delta: ~$31M — meaningful at a 10x revenue multiple where every dollar of working capital flows to enterprise value.
The accepted practice is TTM monthly average for any subscription business; sellers who push for spot get pushed back.
| Company | Profile | DSO | DPO | DefRev / Rev | NWC / Rev |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Klaviyo (KVYO) | eCommerce marketing | 44d | 12d | 14.5% | −7.8% |
| HubSpot (HUBS) | CRM / marketing | 52d | 15d | 12.1% | −6.4% |
| Shopify (SHOP) | eCommerce platform | 28d | 22d | 3.2% | −4.1% |
| BigCommerce (BIGC) | eCommerce platform | 61d | 18d | 10.8% | −2.9% |
| Braze (BRZE) | customer engagement | 68d | 14d | 16.2% | −9.1% |
| Zendesk (private) | customer service | 58d | 17d | 18.4% | −11.2% |
Buyer accepts the balance sheet at a fixed historical date. Seller-friendly if signing at Q1 (peak deferred rev). Locked-box at Mar 31 captures the full -$109M as permanent benefit to the buyer.
NWC trued-up at close. Most common. Buyer pays for actual NWC at close vs target peg. If target is TTM average (-$78M) and close lands at -$95M, buyer pays seller $17M.
Rare in SaaS. Deal priced on enterprise value with NWC entirely outside the bridge — equivalent to assuming target NWC = 0. For Klaviyo, equivalent to handing the seller +$109M.
Customer-funded operations. Klaviyo collects from customers 32 days before it pays suppliers. That gap funds growth without needing capital — and grows when revenue grows. This is the structural reason vertical SaaS trades at the multiples it does.
Spot vs TTM matters more than headlines. A $31M gap between Q1 snapshot and TTM average is the difference between a seller-favorable and a buyer-favorable peg. In a $4.5B deal, that's 70bps of enterprise value moving on one definitional choice.